

EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA TOWARDS MORE AMBITIOUS COLLECTIVE CLIMATE ACTION

By Hans JH Verolme with Enrique Maurtua Konstantinidis and Paola Vasconi Reca



HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG

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Colophon


Acknowledgements


The authors would like to thank the many European and Latin American organisations and interviewees from across a broad spectrum of civil society who have contributed to this report. The opinions expressed and the responsibility for analysis and interpretation of the interviews remains those of the authors.

Coordination and editing by Silvia Brugger
Design and printing by Micheline Gutman

Printed in Belgium, November 2014

Cover pictures:

Above,  Emilia Tjernström [Arriving at the horizon]

Below,  by 350.org – Cough4Coal action, 2013



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D/2014/11.850/5

This publication can be ordered from:

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INTRODUCTION

The urgency to tackle the climate change challenge is greater than ever and time is running out. After the failure of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen five years ago, the global community managed to open another window of opportunity for an international climate agreement that shall be concluded in Paris in 2015. However, this window is extremely limited, and the task is huge. In spite of the frustration with the slow progress of multilateral processes, civil society organisations across the world continuously try to push leaders to commit to meaningful climate action.

In order to keep global warming within the limits of two degrees Celsius, the growth of emissions needs to peak within the next decade. Climate policies must therefore urgently break the current trend and drive the decarbonisation of our economies. A transition to a low carbon economy entails many benefits including better health and enhanced energy security. In order to secure the trend break and deal with climate change impacts, a significant amount of investments is needed for both mitigation and adaptation. Broader shoulders must carry their fair share of the burden.

The clear-cut division between developed and developing countries within the current architecture of the climate negotiations does not reflect today's geopolitical and economic realities. An ambitious and fair global climate deal can only be reached, if alliances can be formed that go beyond this binary split.

The European Union (EU) plays a key role in the international climate negotiations and can leverage support for an ambitious outcome in Paris. However, the EU's commitment to an ambitious climate policy is currently lagging and the credibility of its leadership role is at stake. The time is right to revive European climate leadership and show how the EU can strengthen and build new alliances for a global climate deal.

With the 2014 UN Climate Summit taking place in Lima, Latin America is put into the spotlight of the international climate scene. The region deserves particular attention. Many Latin American countries strive for an ambitious global climate agreement and try to move the negotiations beyond the North-South division. At the same time, the diversity of negotiating groups within the region could help to build trust and enhance understanding between different positions on the basis of common values and identities.

With a third of the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the EU and Latin America hold considerable negotiating power in the multilateral decision-making process. Based on their strong historical, cultural and economic ties, the two regions could strengthen their bi-regional exchange in order to formulate joint objectives in the international climate negotiations. Climate change has also been identified as one of the key themes of EU-Latin America relations.

The Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, with its worldwide network of 30 international offices, supports climate action and civil society participation at the local, national, regional, bi-regional and global level. A diverse spectrum of civil society organisations both in Europe and in Latin America advocates for solutions to the climate crisis and presents alternative development pathways.

The Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union commissioned the experts Hans JH Verolme, Enrique Maurtua Konstantinidis and Paola Vasconi Reca to analyse European and Latin American civil society positions towards Paris. This report tries to explore the potential of joint demands and proposals from the European and Latin American civil society for greater ambition and an equitable climate deal in Paris, while recognising differences in the intra- and inter-regional context.

The partnership between the EU and Latin America could be intensified by taking into account these "common denominators" of civil society at the bi-regional level. An alliance between the European Union and Latin America might be able to develop new narratives beyond the North-South division for an ambitious, binding, fair and equitable global climate agreement in Paris 2015.

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WHY THIS REPORT?

“Everyone lives as though his dreams of the future were already reality.”

Ortega y Gasset

One of the biggest challenges of our time is climate change. If not for the dedication of hundreds of thousands of social activists, making change on the ground, the climate challenge cannot be tackled. Yet, one cannot take on a complex global challenge without taking on power and politics. The optimism with which Spanish author Ortega y Gasset described the mood in Argentina at the end of the nineteenth century, may as well have been written to describe the optimism of the many activists across the world. They are with enthusiasm creating a better life for themselves, their families and communities. This paper is dedicated to them.

The year 2015 marks an important moment for global governance. International negotiations of a global climate change agreement, as well as negotiations for a comprehensive post-2015 development framework are culminating. Global civil society organisations and social movements are understandably apprehensive about the prospect of failure of these negotiations, as happened in Copenhagen in 2009, and are well aware of the risks of cementing low governmental ambition, as evident from the 2012 Rio Summit.

Civil society is, however, not a passive bystander. It has repeatedly proven to be capable of pressuring governments into more ambition in safeguarding the global commons. One can indeed argue that without active involvement of civil society, few international environmental and development agreements would have been agreed let alone implemented. But the record is mixed and for civil society to be more effective it needs to grow its societal, medial and political power. This starts by increasing transparency and

democratic accountability at home, as well as a more focused engagement in international negotiations. The focus needs to be driven by concrete demands and articulation of credible alternatives to business as usual.

This short report provides an introduction to European and Latin American civil society perspectives on international climate change policy and politics. By contributing fresh analysis and exploring the potential for deeper collaboration between Europe and Latin America we hope to inspire collaboration, across the breadth and depth of NGOs and social movements.

We further believe that there is scope for more collaboration towards climate ambition between democratic institutions beyond civil society organisations. So, while this report has been written with the primary aim of stimulating strategic discussions between European and Latin American civil society organisations, especially climate and development NGOs and social movements, our recommendations extend to European institutions, especially the European Parliament, the regional parliaments of Latin America, the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, the European Commission and its European External Action Service, and governments in Latin America and Europe.

At present there is only limited exchange among civil society organisations from both regions on climate change issues. The potential for deeper collaboration is large and the time to explore it is now. In a fast-changing world, the common denominators between Europe and Latin America appear all the more significant. Yet, a better understanding of these common denominators is needed. While Europe and Latin America, in all their diversity, have strong cultural and economic ties, these cannot be taken for granted. To enhance understanding and build

trust, more work is needed. Further articulating and debating commonalities, as well as differences, will be a process between partners that the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung could encourage. Debating and further articulating concrete ideas may place civil society in a stronger position *vis-à-vis* governments when demanding an ambitious, equitable global climate agreement to be signed in Paris in December 2015.¹ In the run-up to Paris, the 2015 EU-CELAC Summit will take place

in Brussels. Together, the 28 EU members and 33 Latin American and Caribbean countries make up almost one third of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). An alliance between the European Union (EU) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has the potential to bring the negotiations closer to a fair and ambitious global climate deal.

¹ See for example Guy Edwards and J. Timmons Roberts (October 2013): The EU and Latin America and the Caribbean: Paving the Road towards a new Global Climate Change Agreement in 2015?, EU-LAC Foundation.

SETTING THE STAGE

The EU has an important role to play and will have to revive its climate leadership, build up confidence and form coalitions in order to make the 2015 Climate Summit, held in Paris, a success. Despite its shortcomings, since 1990 EU leadership has been key to leveraging climate action by forming alliances with other countries, thereby securing political outcomes in Kyoto, Copenhagen and Durban. Yet, the gap between EU rhetoric and international political leadership and the reality on the ground in Europe has grown. Even leading EU officials have admitted to the fact that Europe is no longer a leader when it comes to delivering large emissions reductions at home.

Europe and Latin America share important values and strive for a multilateral and rules-based international system. Climate change has a prominent place on the agenda of the EU's strategic partnership with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Climate protection also plays an important role in bi-regional cooperation, such as the EUROCLIMA programme. However, the rhetoric about the importance of climate action has so far not been translated into much meaningful action on the ground.

Latin America and Europe play a central role in the climate negotiations process. COP20, the 2014 Climate Summit, will take place in Lima and has been prepared in close cooperation by a COP Presidency troika consisting of last year's host Poland, Peru, and France. In the run-up to Paris, the 2015 EU-CELAC Summit will take place in Brussels. Both regions have a stated commitment to achieving an international climate agreement

by 2015 and deeper bi-regional exchange can help to build the necessary trust.

For the more ambitious European countries, the AILAC group of Latin American countries is a natural partner. AILAC, the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean, is a diverse group of Latin American countries with divergent geo-political and economic interests operating within the UN climate negotiations. It was created in Doha, Qatar at COP18 by Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Peru, Guatemala and Panama, supported by the Dominican Republic, who broke rank with the Group of 77 and China on the question of contributions to the global mitigation effort by developing countries. At the time, the Spanish newspaper *El País* called AILAC the "third way" in the climate change negotiations.² To insiders it may not be surprising that AILAC membership overlaps with membership in the Cartagena Dialogue,³ a more informal group created in 2010 that in the context of the international climate discussions seeks solutions to policy challenges. The group is open to countries looking to build an ambitious, comprehensive and legally binding system through constructive positions, and to continue with or promote low-carbon economies in the medium and long term at the domestic level. Several European and Latin American countries are already part of the Cartagena Dialogue of progressive countries.

Both regions are highly diverse and at present Latin America does not speak with one voice within the international climate negotiations. On the one hand, countries represented within AILAC⁴

2 See in the Spanish newspaper *El País* (December 2012): La tercera vía latinoamericana en la negociación del clima, http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2012/12/05/actualidad/1354699047_259945.html

3 The Cartagena Dialogue membership has varied and grown from 27 countries (2010) to more than 40 countries and includes: **Antigua & Barbuda**, Australia, Bangladesh, *Belgium*, Burundi, **Chile**, **Colombia**, **Costa Rica**, *Denmark*, **the Dominican Republic**, Ethiopia, *the European Commission*, *France*, Gambia, Georgia, *Germany*, Ghana, **Grenada**, Indonesia, Kenya, Lebanon, Malawi, Maldives, Marshall Islands, **Mexico**, *Netherlands*, New Zealand, Norway, **Panama**, **Peru**, Rwanda, Samoa, *Spain*, *Sweden*, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, the *UK* and **Uruguay**. (**BOLD = LAC**) (*italics = EU*)

4 The Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (Asociación Independiente de Latinoamérica y el Caribe, AILAC) is a grouping of countries from Latin America and the Caribbean that cooperate on certain issues as a block in international climate negotiations. AILAC includes Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Peru, Guatemala and Panama and is supported by the Dominican Republic.

strive for an alternative approach to the traditional North/South, developed/developing country divide in the climate change negotiations. For these countries, the main goal of the negotiations is to ensure that countries work together positively and proactively within and with other regional groups. AILAC includes members from the Andean Community of Nations and Central America; groups that all need to be engaged if a broader alliance were to be pursued. Other Latin American and Caribbean countries take part in negotiating groupings with opposing positions, such as the Like-Minded Developing Countries,⁵ the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA)⁶ and the BASIC countries.⁷ The countries of the Caribbean mainly tend to align with the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). Equally, the European Union is known to have great difficulty in achieving the necessary consensus

among its members during international climate negotiations. (*See graph of negotiating groups next page.*)

There are also many differences and nuances between EU and Latin American civil society's positions towards the UN climate negotiations. This paper explores some of them. At first glance, this diversity presents a challenge to an EU-LAC ambition alliance on climate change, but we are convinced that great strength can lie in diversity. Notwithstanding the challenge, the time between the Lima and Paris summits should be used to align the strengths of civil society at local, national, regional, bi-regional and global levels and formulate demands to the parties to the UNFCCC in order to forge an ambitious and fair global climate deal in Paris 2015.

5 The Like-Minded Group aims to rigidly defend the principles of the Convention and the existing differentiation between Annex I and Annex II countries (developed/more-responsible, and developing/less-responsible).

6 ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América) constitutes a new Latin American political integration initiative that has emerged to address the US-driven FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas). ALBA comprises of Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Venezuela and Saint Lucia.

7 Brazil, Mexico and Argentina (members of the G20) are countries that act independently due to the size of their economies and level of development. One should also note that in the UN, groupings are not mutually exclusive: Some AILAC members are members of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the Central American Integration System (SICA in Spanish), the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, and the Climate Vulnerable Forum. AILAC has also made joint submissions to the UNFCCC with Mexico.

Relations between Europe and Latin America



The EU-Latin America relationship is the complex sum total of bi-regional, sub-regional and bilateral relations. It has also spurred negotiations on association agreements involving political dialogue, trade and cooperation between the EU on the one side and Latin American sub-regional organisations and individual countries on the other. More recently, a parliamentary dimension and a civil society component have been added to the traditional government-to-government format. Significantly, since the creation of the Community of Latin American (LA) and Caribbean States (CELAC) in 2010, the region increasingly speaks with one voice. Along with growing economic power, there is also growing self-confidence.

The government-to-government dialogue between the EU and Latin America, while building on strong historical and cultural ties has substantially changed. The 2013 Santiago Summit in particular saw a change in tone.⁸ Whereas these Summits were traditionally deemed of little importance by European leaders, the tables were turned and the EU was eating humble pie. The high Latin economic growth figures of the past five years, when compared to Europe, set the tone. The result was a meeting German Chancellor Merkel described as open-minded and dynamic. The EU had hoped to finally sign a free trade agreement with Mercosur, but little was achieved. Despite Brazil, with the support of Chile and Colombia, favouring the agreement, Argentina, the second largest Mercosur member, remained vehemently opposed.⁹ Notwithstanding the economic headlines, the EU is still closely watching political and social changes, be it the (fraught)

state of participative democracy in some Latin American countries or the trend towards greater social inclusion.

Historically, Latin America was a significant beneficiary of European development cooperation. Presently, Latin American countries are solidly in the middle income group¹⁰ and 11 Latin American countries are no longer eligible for official development aid (ODA).

Chile (since 2010) and Mexico (1994) are members of the OECD, generally known as a club of the world's 34 richest industrialized nations. Furthermore, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are members of the group of the 20 major world economies, G20.

Despite these positive developments, EU-Latin America relations are facing major challenges. The past decade has seen the EU focus on the integration of Central and Eastern European members, as well as on the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) economies. As a result of the ongoing global economic and financial crisis, we observed a pivot of geo-political and economic systems towards the Asia-Pacific region. EU trade with Latin America may have continued to increase in value, but the EU has lost market share in Latin America, despite being the predominant investor. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, China will surpass the Eurozone as Latin America's second-largest trading partner by 2016. China is already the biggest trading partner of Brazil, Chile and Peru.¹¹

8 The EU-CELAC Action Plan 2013-2015, dated 27 January 2013, agreed at this Summit includes Chapter 2 "Sustainable Development; Environment; Climate Change; Biodiversity; Energy".

See: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/135043.pdf

9 Chile signed an association agreement with the EU in 2002. Colombia together with Peru signed an agreement in 2012, following negotiations in the context of the Andean community. All three are members of AILAC.

10 According to 2013 World Bank data, only Haiti is a low-income economy with a per capita GNI below US\$ 1,046. The Lower Middle Income developing countries in Latin America (with a GNI per capita between US\$1,046 and \$4,125) are: Bolivia, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. All others are High Middle Income countries. See: <http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups>

11 As reported by the South China Morning Post on 17 March 2014, "China's trade with Latin America set to outpace EU within two years."

See: <http://www.scmp.com/business/economy/article/1450313/chinas-trade-latin-america-set-outpace-eu-within-two-years>

According to the OECD, after a decade of relatively strong growth, Latin America's economic prospects are now constrained by declining global trade, recently depressed commodity prices and deteriorating monetary and financing conditions, as a consequence of the Euro crisis, a slowdown in China's economy, and uncertainty over U.S. monetary policy. While commodity exports had allowed Latin America to substitute locally manufactured goods with imports, these have undermined its productive capacities.¹²

There are deep political and ideological divisions and major economic asymmetries within the EU's traditional Latin American sub-regional counterparts as well as disagreement with the EU's position on key market-access issues. These have so far prevented the envisaged "network of association agreements", which were central to the EU regional integration strategy for Latin America, from materialising in full. Irritants in the relationship have been labour and human rights, for example in Colombia in the context of the EU-Colombia and Peru free trade agreement, and the environmental and social impacts of Brazil's construction of the Belo Monte hydro-electric dam.

Bilateral economic and political cooperation in recent years tends to focus on access to resources and investment cooperation. Germany, for example, negotiated a raw materials agreement with Chile, signed by Chancellor Merkel on the sidelines of the January 2013 EU-CELAC Summit in Santiago de Chile. German industry, however, complains that in the end the agreement did not provide them with the preferential market access they were seeking.

To put all this in an economic perspective, according to the European External Action Service (EEAS), EU-LA trade in goods more than doubled

over the last decade from some €100 to €200 billion (6.3% of total EU trade and 13% of LA trade). In 2010, the EU was the leading foreign investor in the region, accounting for €385 billion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), or 43% of the region's total FDI. EU FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean was higher than EU FDI in Russia, China and India combined.

The EU has provided €2.7 billion in official development assistance (ODA) under the Development Cooperation Instrument for Latin America 2007-2013. In 2010, the European Commission launched the Latin America Investment Facility (LAIF), a blending instrument to support public investment in strategic sectors. Blending instruments mix development aid with loans from International Financial Institutions. They have become the European Commission's flagship of innovative financing for the private sector. LAIF has been criticized by NGOs, such as Aprodev, as it diverts ODA funds from poverty alleviation towards the private sector for large infrastructure investments.¹³ Overall, the EU financial contribution to regional programmes for the period 2007-2013 amounts to €556 million. Today, besides the LAIF, what remains of development cooperation is an exchange of good policy practices, with support for national public policies and strengthening institutional capacities.

Priorities for the EU-LA regional cooperation (and corresponding programmes) are:

- social cohesion (EUROSociAL, Urb-AL, Al-Invest);
- sustainable development, including climate change (EURO-SOLAR, EUROCLIMA, WATERCLIMA-LAC, RALCEA, FLEGT South America); and,
- promotion of higher education and research (ALFA, Erasmus Mundus).

12 See International Economic Forum Latin America and the Caribbean (June 2014): Summary Record, http://www.oecd.org/site/lacforum/SummaryRecord_LACForum2014.pdf

13 Hernandez and Sandell (March 2013): Aid for a green development: the Latin American Investment Facility (LAIF) on the making, Aprodev. See: http://www.aprodev.eu/files/Central_America/laif%20on%20the%20making_march_final.pdf. See also Tovar et al. (June 2013): New European Union development cooperation strategies in Latin America: The Latin American Investment Facility (LAIF), <http://euodad.org/files/pdf/5229de0400b27.pdf>; Sandell and Hernandez (2012): Aid for the Latin America Investment Facility: Clarity on private sector and focus towards SMEs needed, in: Reality of Aid 2012 Report, http://www.realityofaid.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ROA_Report_2012-Aid_and_the_Private_Sector1.pdf

Latin American Civil Society Positions Towards the Climate Summit in Paris

By Enrique Maurtua Konstantinidis and Paola Vasconi Reca



Latin America and the Caribbean is a very diverse region in many respects. Be it geographical, biological, economic, political or socio-cultural, differences can be observed all the way from the north of Mexico to the south of Argentina, and from the Pacific Ocean through the Caribbean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean. This diversity does not exclude political ideologies and positions and is also reflected in civil society organisations and social movements.

Nowadays, an ever-increasing trend can be observed in Latin America and the Caribbean to return to the production of primary commodities for export. As a supplier of raw materials and natural resources, the region occupies the weakest link in global value chains. The increasingly intensive exploitation of these resources has led to an increase in greenhouse gas emissions and a decrease in the availability of natural resources. The region specialises in the extraction and export of fossil fuels such as oil and natural gas, and it has been developing energy megaprojects to enable the extraction and export of minerals. The predominant agricultural model is based on large-scale monocultures, which is directly linked to high rates of deforestation, as well as the use of huge amounts of water, soil, fertilisers and agrochemicals. With a mobility system based on road transport and highly energy and carbon intensive industries, it is clear that there are huge challenges ahead for the decarbonisation of the Latin American model of economic development.¹⁴

In this context, a very wide range of national and sub-regional realities determine the priorities, and even the ideologies of organisations and movements. These in turn influence positions on certain topics that need to be worked on by consensus in the international climate negotiations.

Furthermore, there are considerable differences of the thematic entry points, the level of involvement and the actual capacities to engage on topics related to climate negotiations. It is necessary to note that very few Latin American organisations make a detailed political and technical follow-up of climate negotiations or even participate at the COPs. This often makes it difficult to identify positions that clearly refer to the negotiating texts of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In fact, positions rather refer more specifically to national, sub-regional and regional contexts and only in a more general sense to the negotiation process. In addition, within the Latin American civil society, some organisations and movements work from a perspective of opposition and resistance, whereas others pursue more conciliatory approaches with respect to the design and implementation of public policies.

In order to explore the potential of joint demands and proposals from European and Latin American civil societies for an ambitious, binding, fair and equitable global climate agreement in Paris 2015, this chapter aims to identify common elements of the positions of the Latin American civil society, which for the purpose of this analysis is defined to comprise Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and social movements that are associated with the international climate change negotiations (UNFCCC).

For this purpose, the work has managed to gather, arrange and analyse elements and proposals from 30 positions of the entire region between 2012¹⁵ and September 2014. These positions correspond to national organisations (nine countries: Santa Lucia, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina and Chile), regional

14 Ana Toni (July-August 2014): De Varsovia a Lima. ¿Dónde estamos? ¿Qué vendrá? ¿Cómo puede contribuir América Latina?, in: Nueva Sociedad, N° 252, ISSN: 0251-3552, http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/4041_1.pdf

15 In December 2011, the Durban platform was formed. The goal of the governments is to launch "a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention that will come into effect and be implemented from 2020". Consequently, it is assumed that the positions from that year on would provide for relevant issues for negotiation.

organisations (positions of regional organisations or consortia of organisations¹⁶) and sub-regional organisations (Central America, Amazonia, Andean Region). They come from gender, development, indigenous and environmental organisations.

Publicly disclosed and available positions were collected while trying to ensure a representative sample of the Latin American region that reflects both the diversity of views and ideologies and the geographical distribution and priorities. Secondly, the views of organisations that participate or are associated with the following observer constituencies of the UNFCCC process were considered: women and gender, environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGO), indigenous peoples organisations and youth non-governmental organisations (YOUNGO).

This document is not a position in itself. It only aims to reflect those elements of the priorities of the Latin American civil society which influence demands and proposals with regard to climate change and the international negotiation process.

The positions of the organisations refer at different levels of detail to issues under the United Nations climate negotiations. It should be mentioned that in many cases, positions are related to internal demands and the need for public policies to address the climate change challenge in the respective countries, and that the group's expectations from the negotiations are concluded from there. The identification of issues is relatively simple. Firstly, the subject matter is considered (forests, risks, emissions reduction, etc.), secondly, the position and/or demand is analysed (commitment, measures, programmes) and finally, extrapolated to the international debate.

In order to analyse the positions, the following categories were created by taking into account key issues of the current negotiation process:

1. The Durban Platform
2. Equity
3. The Emissions Gap
4. Finance and other means of implementation
5. Adaptation, Loss and Damage
6. Forests and REDD
7. Technology Transfer and Cooperation
8. Alternative Development Pathways

Generally speaking, civil society positions make a direct or indirect reference to each of these categories, and within each category, there are more specific issues that are listed in detail below.

An additional cross-cutting issue is the participation of civil society actors.¹⁷ The organisations and movements continuously mention that their views should be considered at all levels of decision and policy making processes. With a wide range of demands, the positions seek and promote active participation for an inclusive and transparent climate negotiation process.

The Durban Platform

With regard to the Durban Platform, or the new climate agreement, Latin American organisations ask for full compliance with the principles of the Convention, highlighting:

- the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), on the basis of fair distribution of responsibilities and commitments when taking action to contribute to solving the problem;

16 Construyendo Puentes (space for dialogue between networks, platforms and forums in alliance with movements, campaigns and institutions to address climate change); Climate Action Network-Latin America (CAN-LA); Plataforma Climática Latinoamericana; Juventud Latinoamericana (Latin American youth organisation); AIDA Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense; AVINA Foundation; Climate Finance Group for Latin America and the Caribbean (Grupo de financiamiento climático para América Latina y el Caribe, GFLAC); Margarita Declaration; Foro de Mujeres Indígenas (Indigenous Women's Forum).

17 This topic has not been included on the list as it is a cross-cutting issue of the proposed categorisation.

- the precautionary principle, which stipulates that political measures should not affect the environment and at the same time respect the “right to development”;¹⁸

- the polluter pays principle which makes those that pollute and thus contribute to the problem responsible for the damage caused.¹⁹

In many cases, it is also emphasised that the new agreement must be equitable, as well as fair and binding.

The positions generally express the recognition of historical responsibility as a key determinant of a given country’s emissions reductions commitment. Historical responsibility is the amount of responsibility that a country accumulates due to its pollution in a certain time frame. Consequently, those countries that have managed to reach a higher level of socioeconomic wealth at the expense of causing incessant pollution since the industrial revolution, have to assume a higher responsibility than those which only started to develop and pollute in recent years.

Few organisations²⁰ refer to a fixed emissions reduction commitment. The Humboldt Centre and Construyendo Puentes, for instance, point to the need to reduce emissions by 50% until 2020 and by 95% until 2050 in comparison with 1990. Of all the analysed positions, the Nicaraguan Climate Change Alliance (ANACC), the National Roundtable for Risk Management (MNGR) and the Grupo Peru COP20²¹ refer to national contribu-

tions and one position states that the commitments of the new agreement should include adaptation.

Equity

While there are not many Latin American organisations that make a direct reference to equity, some explicitly state that the new agreement should respect the principles of equity and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities.

Civil society organisations and particularly indigenous movements also stress the need to recognise the differentiated impacts of climate change in a way that considered gender equality and equitable national climate policies within the global agreement. The Grupo Perú COP20²² proposed that the COP20 negotiations should accept the resolution adopted at COP18 in Doha in order to achieve gender equality in the representations of parties and decision-making processes.

The issue of sovereignty of the peoples and resources cannot be ignored. Therefore, the demand for an equitable agreement is of crucial importance to the civil society organisations. Any agreement must respect what each country can contribute in line with its common but differentiated responsibilities in an equitable manner. At the same time, while often facing great challenges of reducing poverty, inequality and vulnerability, the peoples’ right to sustainable development of their nations needs to be guaranteed.

18 While some organisations have joined certain states in pointing to their need to “develop”, the precautionary principle claims that serious or irreversible environmental harm is to be avoided even though the scientific knowledge on the issue is incomplete or inconclusive. At the same time, it suggests a sustainable way of consumption, which includes fundamental changes in lifestyle towards the quality of life and material sufficiency in a finite world. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see E. Gudynas (2008): *Ética y desarrollo sostenible. América Latina frente al debate internacional*, México DF: Instituto Mora, 273-292.

19 Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Brasil, 1992, see: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm>. In some cases, it is clarified that this principle should not be confused with payment for the right to pollute which instead should be compensation due to the damage caused by climate change.

20 Among them are: Construyendo Puentes (space for dialogue between networks, platforms and forums in alliance with movements, campaigns and institutions to address climate change), and Central America-based organisations (Mesoamerican Campaign for Climate Justice, ACT Alliance, CLAI, Central American Alliance for Resilience).

21 Grupo Peru COP20 (2013): *Nuestra posición frente a la COP 20*, http://grupoperucop20.org.pe/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=70&Itemid=225

22 Collective of organisations, committees, NGOs, trade unions, indigenous, women, youth, church and media groups, and other civil society institutions all over Peru.

The Emissions Gap

While the UNFCCC negotiations anticipate long-term emission reductions for the new agreement (post 2020), they also consider short-term mitigation actions before 2020. This negotiation stream is known as the pre-2020 ambition. The Latin American organisations do not explicitly cover this topic in the analysed positions, but there is a clear appeal of urgency to those countries with the highest emission levels for immediate action. The gigatonne gap is mentioned explicitly in two positions,²³ which request action plans to deal with it: “We need to continue working towards the implementation of a work plan aimed at closing the gigatonne gap of greenhouse gas emissions in global terms, as established by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)”.²⁴

The development of energy alternatives and efficiency plans for a low-carbon future in Latin America is presented as a great opportunity that can, on the one hand, contribute to the challenge of reducing emissions and, on the other hand, ensure the wellbeing of the people. In this context, civil society organisations, and particularly those based in middle-income countries, clearly state which development model/energy model they prefer for their countries, and in many cases, which development model/energy model and practices they reject. A recurring factor in the positions is the call for more non-conventional renewable energies²⁵ in the energy matrix (primary and secondary), and the efficient use of energy to reduce the countries’ vulnerability and to enhance energy security. Furthermore, there is a strong demand for a fair energy/economic transition; given that the current development model in many countries implies a high dependence on fossil fuels and that abrupt changes in the incumbent systems could have an impact on national economies with social repercussions.

When it comes to undesirable solutions, there is a clear opposition to the so-called “false solutions” to climate change. Amongst some of the most prominent ones, carbon markets are criticized as very ineffective incentives (or which would require in-depth assessment before serious consideration). Large hydro power marketed as clean energy and the use of geoengineering or climate engineering as a solution to the climate problem are also critiqued as “false solutions”. Additionally, the Latin American civil society has indicated that nuclear energy is not a solution to climate change and that in fact it poses numerous risks.

Finance and Other Means of Implementation

In terms of finance and means for implementation, the Latin American civil society’s position is categorical: more developed countries with more historical responsibility should contribute the financial support that is required for the developing countries to deal with mitigation and the development adaptation measures as well as the compensation for loss and damages caused by extreme climate change-driven phenomena.

NGOs and social movements of Latin America and the Caribbean are urgently requesting to capitalise the Green Climate Fund (GCF) in order to contribute to the implementation of the above-mentioned items. On various occasions, there is a reference to the need for financial support from public and secure sources in addition to international aid, and in some cases to innovative, such as for example the investment of 1% of the global GDP. Reference is also made to the need for transparency and accountability mechanisms in order to ensure that the funds are used for the intended purposes.

23 Construyendo Puente (September 2014): Posicionamiento: Construyendo Puentes, frente a la agenda global de cambio climático y desarrollo, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/244214104/CONSTRUYENDO-PUENTES-FRENTE-A-LA-AGENDA-GLOBAL-DE-CAMBIO-CLIMATICO-Y-DESARROLLO>; Declaration of the 5th regional Encounter (September 2014): ¡Centroamérica vulnerable, Unida por la vida! ¡Por el Derecho a la sobrevivencia, demandamos un nuevo régimen para el clima legalmente vinculante! Managua, Nicaragua, <http://mngnrcaragua.org/?p=1256>

24 Declaration of the 5th regional Encounter (September 2014), <http://mngnrcaragua.org/?p=1256>

25 Non-conventional renewable energy sources include: wind, small hydro, biomass and biogas, geothermal, solar and tidal energy.

Adaptation, Loss and Damage

The Latin American civil society emphasises the vulnerability of Latin America to climate change, in particular the Central American region. The call for access to support from the GCF and the Adaptation Fund is related to this, given that the least developed countries (LDCs) and the islands (AOSIS) currently present the priority countries in negotiations.

Furthermore, the Latin American civil society, and in particular the NGOs and social movements of Central America, highlight the importance of advancing with the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage at COP20, so that it starts to operate in an efficient and immediate manner.

The issues of community-based adaptation and ecosystem-based adaptation are mainly raised by indigenous movements and organisations.²⁶ Various groups call for the need to prioritise ecosystems that sustain their livelihoods. Ecosystem-based adaptation is considered to contribute to a wide range of benefits, such as securing resources to small communities, water protection and protection against disasters. Indigenous organisations emphasise the importance of community-based adaptation in order to ensure the survival of small communities.

Forests and REDD

There are not many common denominators concerning the issue of forests because of the diversity of views – as reflected in the vast biodiversity of the most tropical areas of the continent – which demonstrates the complexity of the given negotiation positions.

The organisations clearly manifest their interest and intention to preserve the Amazon

rainforest, its biodiversity and contribution to the stability of the climate as a sink for greenhouse gases. Indigenous and Andean groups are highly involved, and continuously stress the intrinsic value of the forests, particularly in relation to their ecosystem services, such as the protection of river sources and water security.

It is important to take note of the divisions in the views on the REDD+ mechanism. On the one hand, there are actors that propose a broad approach that includes various mechanisms for forest protection and conservation of carbon sinks, such as: Sustainable Territory Management, REDD+, Amazonian Indigenous REDD+, Joint Mitigation and Adaptation Mechanism for Holistic and Sustainable Management of Forests and Mother Earth.²⁷ On the other hand, there are organisations that do not support the REDD+ mechanisms at all as they consider them to be a new type of market mechanism that could endanger the intrinsic value of forests and turn them into mere economic assets.

There is also particular reference to the role of women and indigenous peoples in REDD+ initiatives and their ability to contribute ancestral knowledge. The issue of access to REDD+ finance plays a role as well.

Technology Transfer and Cooperation

According to an underlying principle of the climate negotiations, the most developed countries should support developing countries by transferring funds, technology and knowledge. While there are very few positions from the Latin American civil society that specifically refer to the discussions on knowledge and technology transfer in climate negotiations, the organisations send a very clear message with regard to these topics:

26 Pacto de Unidad de Organizaciones Indígenas del Perú (July 2014): Propuestas frente al Cambio Climático; Foro Mujeres Indígenas frente al Cambio Climático (Indigenous Women's Forum on Climate Change) (July 2014): Recomendaciones para los Estados.

27 This mechanism (in Spanish: Mecanismo Conjunto de Mitigación y Adaptación al Cambio Climático para el Manejo Integral y Sustentable de los Bosques y la Madre Tierra) is a proposal made by the Bolivian Government that aims to work on conserving forests while working on mitigation and adaptation components at the same time. Bolivia has presented this mechanism in the UNFCCC as an alternative to the REDD+ projects to avoid the possible market system participation. See: http://www.bivica.org/upload/bosques-politica_bolivia.pdf

the transfer of technology and knowledge should be unconditional and the richer countries have the responsibility to do so free of charge and without regard to problems associated with intellectual property.

Alternative Development Pathways

When we consider cross-cutting and holistic issues relevant to climate debates, Latin American organisations reflect highly diverse contexts and world views. Accordingly, there is a series of elements that form the views and, consequently, the positions of Latin American organisations. In general, the organisations repeatedly demand a life style that goes in line with the ancestral knowledge of indigenous people, respect for nature and the rights of Mother Earth. This is why the concept of “Buen Vivir” or “Good life”, which originates from the indigenous in South America, has been adopted in several statements (*see box below*). This concept outlines a comprehensive world view of the practices of production and consumption of societies, favouring local production and consumption while decentralising production and becoming more environmentally aware for the wellbeing of all people and the eradication of poverty. Within the context of the UNFCCC, this would correspond to shared vision and effort sharing.

“Buen Vivir” as an Alternative to Development

Nowadays, the concept of “Buen Vivir” (Spanish for “good life”) is not just a philosophy that has been passed down from Latin American ancestors. It is also being presented as an alternative to the current anthropocentric development model. Indigenous people believe that the Western model of neoliberal capitalism, is responsible

Existing positions that deal with the “green economy” (which are not many) are generally critiqued, as “green-washed capitalism” or “market environmentalism”, so it is inferred that it would not be supported.

On several occasions, the concept of climate justice appears as a demand by organisations and social movements in response to inaction of those countries most responsible for the climate change problem. In response to the non-compliance of many Kyoto Protocol member countries, a considerable number of organisations from Latin American civil society demand a climate justice court that penalizes companies and states for non-compliance.²⁸

The topic of agriculture has been present within the UNFCCC for only a few years now, but various climate-friendly initiatives have already begun. While the developed countries are intensely negotiating agricultural practices and their impact on the countries’ emissions, developing countries stress the need to adapt the crops to ensure food production and the livelihood of numerous small farmers. In their positions, Latin American organisations and movements do not refer directly to this debate, but it is clear that the most important aspect from a social perspective is to prevent

for the present environmental, financial, food, energy and social crises. These crises are characterised by inequality between rich and poor, discrimination, hunger, disease and the destruction of Mother Earth. They aim to re-establish a different conception and model of life, and propose an alternative development model based on ancestral knowledge and adapted to current policies and strategies.²⁹

28 In a symbolic gesture, a group of organisations created a Court where those responsible for climate crimes are “morally” penalised. For more information, see the following links:

<http://www.radiomundoreal.fm/Hay-responsables>

<http://marxmadera.org/tribunal-internacional-de-justicia-climatica>

<http://alainet.org/active/33660&lang=es> 29

29 D. Choquehuanca C. (2010): Hacia la reconstrucción del Vivir Bien. América Latina en Movimiento, ALAI, No 452: 6-13; E. Gudynas/A. Acosta (2011): El Buen Vivir más allá del desarrollo. Qué Hacer, DESCO, February/March, Lima; F. Huanacuni Mamani (2010): Vivir Bien / Buen Vivir, Convenio Andrés Bello, International Institute of Investigation and CAOÍ, La Paz; Maïté Niel (2011): El Concepto del Buen Vivir, Research Work – Expert Title on Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and International Cooperation, Madrid.

the opening of new agricultural frontiers and the displacement of peasants by the agro-industrial companies, and to strengthen small-scale farming to achieve food security³⁰ and sovereignty³¹ – topics that are closely linked to the fight against poverty.

Conclusions

Civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean has clear goals with regard to the needs of its own communities, countries and sub-regions. In spite of different nuances there are demands that coincide. It is important to point out, however, that the wide diversity of contexts within the continent also makes it difficult to cover everything and find common denominators for all the topics mentioned.

- Adaptation and access to the International Mechanism for Loss and Damage are priority topics for Latin America as it is not identified as a priority region among the most vulnerable ones.

- There are differences of opinion regarding mechanisms related to forests protection, and REDD+ is a difficult topic to address with just one position.

- Non-conventional renewable energies are a strong common point, and the transition to societies that are less dependent on fossil fuels is widely accepted, provided that precaution is taken to ensure a fair process that does not put ecosystems and national economies at risk.

- International support (financial, technological and capacity-building) should be unconditional and must come from the countries that are more responsible and have higher capacities.

- Market-based systems are very controversial as are practices which are not widely tested (geoengineering).

- The concept of “Buen Vivir” (Spanish for “good life”) is a way to ensure a holistic view of the measures that the new global agreement resolves.

- The Latin American civil society asks for ways of participation in decision-making processes in order to ensure the inclusiveness and transparency of any adopted measures.

Despite the diversity of positions expressed by the organisations and movements in Latin America, it is possible to find spaces for collaboration and political dialogue, particularly with regard to achieving a new global agreement in 2015 that is binding, ambitious, equitable and fair. The organisations recognise the historical responsibility of industrialised countries in the climate change phenomenon. In general, they also clearly demand that developing Latin American countries should not establish the same production and consumption patterns to achieve “development”. Therefore, there are possibilities for civil society to support actions and measures that prevent an increase in emissions in the region and that enable the transition to societies and economies that are less dependent on fossil fuels. In this sense, the promotion of non-conventional renewable energy sources stands out as potential common ground between governments, parliaments and civil society.

It is also evident that Latin America urgently needs to commence adaptation measures, as many of the impacts of climate change are already a reality in the region. Various stakeholders could undoubtedly work together on this issue. However, the lack of resources and other regional priorities (poverty and inequality) prevent the development of adaptation measures. A joint dialogue space can emerge by pushing together for the capitalisation of the Green Climate Fund.

30 Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. FAO (2011): An Introduction to the Basic Concepts of Food Security, <http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al936e/al936e00.pdf>

31 Food sovereignty is the right of peoples and their countries to determine their own agricultural and food policies. Via Campesina: <http://viacampesina.org/es/index.php/temas-principales-mainmenu-27/soberanalimentary-comercio-mainmenu-38/314-que-es-la-soberania-alimentaria>

European Civil Society Positions Towards the Climate Summit in Paris



Before providing an analysis of European civil society perspectives on the international climate policy process and the road to Paris, it is worth noting there are hundreds of European social movements and non-governmental organisations active on climate change and related development and environmental issues. The Climate Action Network – Europe alone represents over 120 members organisations from 25 countries, several of which are themselves networks of national and local organisations. Similarly, the Brussels-based European Environment Bureau represents over 140 member organisations with over 15 million members at the EU-level. Several global networks of development and environmental organisations have headquarters in Europe. To name a few: the ACT Alliance, Birdlife, CARE, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, Oxfam and WWF.

When speaking about European civil society positions it is important to note that, compared to many other regions, the capacity to engage in detailed policy deliberations with governments is high. However, European civil society itself has become internally divided as increasingly activists from e.g. the anti-globalization and farmers movements step back from lobbying governments. They are more focused on campaigning and direct action. Finally, European NGOs have the capacity to engage with colleagues around the globe and have through dialogue both learned from and informed the work of civil society organisations in other regions. This has enriched and is increasingly reflected in the positions that European NGOs take.

In the eyes of civil society, Europe has lost its erstwhile leadership position on climate action (*see box below*). There is broad agreement within European civil society that an ambitious and binding global climate agreement in Paris is essential. Furthermore, there is a degree of realism about how successful international climate change negotiations can be. For that reason, civil society has been focusing on demanding action at home and targeting fossil fuel polluters more directly. In contrast from the run-up to Copenhagen, European civil society is not narrowly focused on securing an international agreement. Civil society

is now demanding a three-pronged response to the climate crisis:

1. Low-carbon sustainable development, including an energy transition, as well as sustainable production and consumption patterns.
2. Ensuring climate resilience, enabling adaptation, and developing disaster risk reduction strategies.
3. Policy coherence at home, and abroad across international organisations and agreements, including providing means of implementation to developing countries.

In the next section the policy positions and perspectives of European civil society organisations on the Paris agreement are summarized. As not every detail of these positions is widely shared or publicly available, these were obtained in part through interviews with staff of the relevant organisations. But before doing so, in order to understand the perspectives and focus of European civil society advocacy on climate change policy and a possible international climate change agreement, we need to review the current debate about European climate and energy policy, i.e. the so called EU 2030 package. The 2030 package has four closely interlinked pillars: the framework for climate and energy beyond 2020; EU energy security; the completion of the single energy market; and external energy policy. The political deliberations are almost by definition short-term and focus on energy prices and industrial competitiveness, as these are primary objectives of the economics and energy ministries and the subject of strong business lobbies. There is hardly any consideration of the pathway to deep emissions reductions required by mid-century nor of the significant global implications of a loss of EU leadership in the area of climate change policy.

With regards to the second pillar, coherence between the climate/energy framework and the energy security strategy needs to be ensured. In reality, though, coherence is a highly subjective matter. The debate about energy security has thus become a clash between national interests of member states, depending on their respective energy mix and the extent of their dependence on (imported) fossil fuels.

Furthermore, in part due to recent tensions between the EU and Russia, energy security has come to be narrowly defined as reducing insecurity in the provision of natural gas. It is argued by governments that this requires a strengthening of the internal market, more inter-connections of the electricity grid, and reverse flow capacity of gas pipelines to those countries that are highly dependent on Russian gas. Reducing dependence on natural gas as such is rarely seriously considered.

Sadly, Europe's external energy policy under the guise of diversification has become primarily a policy of building gas infrastructure and exploring fossil fuels in the Mediterranean and Caspian regions.

Whereas most NGOs have focused their advocacy efforts on the first pillar (i.e. the framework for climate and energy beyond 2020), it is important to understand that the Commission, ministers in the Council and the EU Parliament consider them as a package and that in deal making political trade-offs are sought between the pillars. The recent crisis in the Ukraine should have refocused European political will on reducing vulnerability to fossil energy shocks, as NGOs like Oxfam have called for.³² Instead politicians are looking to import fossil fuels from other regions.

European Climate Ambition

Today, the EU has almost met its climate target for 2020 of a 20% emissions reduction below 1990 levels. This early achievement was possible in part because of the economic crisis, which slowed growth of the European economy from 2009 onwards, as well as a large package of policies and measures across many economic sectors. The European Environment Agency has projected that the additional targets of 20% renewable energy and 20% improvement in energy efficiency would likely also be met. Nine countries were making good progress in meeting the three targets. However, six countries will likely not achieve their 2020 targets through domestic policies and measures. Furthermore, it is of concern that little or no emissions cuts are achieved in the transport and agriculture sectors.³³

Europe's claim of international climate leadership stems from the 20% target, which is strong when compared to other rich economies. For international comparison it is, however, important to recall the EU was ready, willing and able to increase the target to 30% at Copenhagen if others did their part. Other countries would not

and did not even ask the EU to increase its ambition, leaving EU leaders disillusioned. Secondly, one needs to understand that the 2020 target includes offsets. Put simply, the target could be met by using well over 50% of international emissions reduction units. NGOs have repeatedly argued that many international offsets are non-additional in character. Furthermore, so called "hot air" allowances granted to Eastern European economies mean that the true reductions will be well below 20%.

To assess future European climate ambition it is noteworthy that the EU's 2030 target is a domestic target of at least 40% emissions reductions below 1990 levels. It needs to be achieved within the EU. While condemned by European NGOs as failing in credibility and falling short of the 55% reduction that science demands,³⁴ the *character* of the GHG target is stronger than that for 2020. The additional targets of increasing renewable energy to make up at least 27% of final energy consumption and a minimum 27% reduction in energy consumption are very weak when compared to business-as-usual and are not nationally binding. Furthermore, what the fair, equitable share of each EU member state is still needs to

32 See Oxfam press release on the occasion of the G7 Summit in Brussels, dated 3 June 2014 at <http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2014-06-03/g7-and-europe-face-energy-wake-call-food-and-fuel-crisis-looms>

33 EEA Report No 6/2014 (October 2014): Tracking progress towards Europe's climate and energy targets for 2020.

34 See for example WWF's statement at http://www.wwf.eu/media_centre/?231590/EU-fails-credibility-test-on-2030-climate-and-energy-ambition

be decided. It has already been agreed that half of EU emissions would be covered by a reformed Emissions Trading System. No intermediate targets for 2025 have been set, which makes comparison with, for example, the proposed target for the U.S. difficult.

From an international perspective, it is important to know there is some limited scope for

enhancing the EU's 2030 package as it is subject to permanent review by heads of government. Ultimately, European climate ambition will also depend on the ambition of other countries. If leaders from other countries could tell European leaders that *they* can do more that might lead Europe to review, for example, its ambition on renewable energy and energy efficiency.

The Durban Platform

The Durban ambition alliance, which despite enormous differences in perspective saw the Africa Group, the Least Developed Countries and the Alliance of Small Island States join hands with the European Union and enabled the launch of negotiations towards a 2015 Paris agreement. Clearly, the ambition of a Paris climate agreement crucially depends on the political visibility of the climate change challenge. Admittedly, this visibility has dramatically declined since 2009. The latest IPCC report did not create a wave of media attention, as did the last instalment. Notwithstanding half a million people marching worldwide for climate ambition, ahead of the UN Climate Summit of September 2014, leaders did not make the much needed commitments of deep emission reductions.

Most European NGOs share the view of their leaders that the world has changed a lot since the creation of the developed and developing country annexes to the UN climate convention and that retaining this division is unhelpful. A Paris agreement should include all countries even if their commitments would vary. They are, however, more positive about the mitigation ambition of developing countries than their governments.

Since the failure of Copenhagen, many countries and NGOs are distrustful of any COP President. As COP21 will take place in Europe, all eyes are not only on France but also on the EU as a group. NGOs have openly expressed concerns about the incoming European Commission and

its commitment to the climate change agenda. With former Polish Prime Minister Tusk acting as the President of the EU Council, will the power of the Visegrád group of countries³⁵ over climate and energy policy grow? Will an unpopular French president Hollande be strong enough to strike an ambitious deal? For now, these are questions that cannot be answered.

The basic architecture of a Paris Agreement can be found in the structure of the ADP process. Workstream 1 will be an agreement between all countries covering the period beyond 2020. Workstream 2 will be a package of measures increasing ambition pre-2020. This is covered below in the section on the Emissions Gap.

The legal shape of the post-2020 agreement is a topic that few NGOs engage in. Some of the large international networks, which include their European staff, have views on e.g. the bindingness of the agreement on different countries, the framework for registering plans and turning them into legal commitments, etc. What remains a big question for Europe is whether the United States will decisively act on climate change or whether an intransigent Congress will block the intended administrative action. Secondly, what will China put on the table in addition to an aspirational 2030 peaking goal? No matter the importance of the G2 announcement, as Durban showed, there is a growing recognition that it matters a lot what other, more progressive countries can and will do. That is not purely a political or diplomatic question and civil society has an important role to play here.

35 The Visegrád Group is an alliance of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia created in 1991 to further their European integration, as well as their military, economic and energy cooperation. The group has repeatedly resisted more ambitious EU climate policy, as it requires a fundamental shift in its coal dependent energy sector.

Equity

The climate change challenge is at its core a moral challenge. Fairness, inter-generational justice and equity are principles that civil society demands should be at the core of a 2015 agreement. They need to be operationalized when deciding effort-, opportunity- and risk-sharing. Equity is a contentious topic both within Europe as well as in the international negotiations. Only the 2030 target for GHG emissions, agreed by European heads of government in October 2014, is binding on national governments, but the fair share of the individual member states has not yet been agreed.

In the UN context, the debate centres around implementation of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), contained in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Most recently, the UN reaffirmed the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities as contained in Article 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in its Outcome Document of the Special Event on the Millennium Development Goals and Post-2015. It seems, however, that no government is willing to subject its proposed international commitments to an independent review that would assess adequacy of ambition, comparability of effort and fairness, as demanded by European civil society. Possibly as a consequence of this moral failing, European NGOs like Greenpeace are exploring legal options, including for example international climate liability.

The Emissions Gap

European NGOs clearly state that climate action cannot wait until 2020, through implementation of a Paris agreement assuming one is reached. Since Copenhagen, NGOs have lobbied within the UNFCCC context under Workstream 2 of the ADP process for a closing of the ambition gap resulting from the failure of governments to make commitments that are adequate to limiting

warming to below 2 degrees Celsius. Importantly, they have launched a number of campaigns for urgent short-term action, e.g. for 100% renewable energy and halting deforestation.

In 2012, European NGOs released detailed analysis³⁶ on how the EU can help close this emissions gap and lobbied for the EU to go beyond its stated 2020 ambition. However, the political realities were such that these common sense proposals, which did not require additional legislation, were ignored. The necessary reform of the European Emissions Trading System was botched, due to lobbying by dirty industry and recalcitrance from Member States like Poland.

Finance and Other Means of Implementation

The support needed by developing countries in order to be able to adequately respond to the climate challenge is called the necessary means of implementation within the UNFCCC negotiations. European civil society demands that such means of implementation need to be part of the commitments countries take on in Paris.

Civil society is demanding that the promises European governments made in the Copenhagen Accord are kept, i.e. that Europe's fair share of €24.3 billion of the US\$ 100 billion in climate finance is delivered annually by 2020, and scaled-up considerably thereafter. This includes US\$ 5 billion towards the initial capitalization of the Green Climate Fund.³⁷

Many, if not all, organisations believe that half of public climate finance should be allocated to adaptation. This aims at countering a bias among donor countries towards funding mitigation action. As a large segment of civil society active on international climate change policy hails from the development community, it may not be surprising they demand public climate finance should be new and additional to conventional ODA.

36 CAN Europe (November 2012): Closing the ambition gap – What Europe can do.

37 See for example EEB's letter to Environment Ministers of 20 October 2014 at <http://www.eeb.org/EEB/?LinkServID=C3435A2B-5056-B741-DB005F7A20BF3C60&showMeta=0>

Indeed public climate finance should be additional to the 0.7% of GNI that donor countries have committed to providing, but have largely failed to deliver. Development assistance should be climate-smart and support the delivery of access to clean energy.

Adaptation, Loss and Damage

European development NGOs in particular argue that adaptation should play a significant part in the 2015 agreement and that a global adaptation goal should be set, targeting risk reduction and improved climate resilience, especially of poor and marginalized people. This is inextricably linked to ensuring their food security.

The UN's Adaptation Fund seems to have been all but forgotten with most organisations only referencing funding for the Green Climate Fund. Increasingly, it is clear that lack of climate ambition and delayed mitigation action have increased the risk of irreversible consequences. The adaptation – mitigation continuum has come to include loss and damage. As some consequences of climate change are beyond adaptation, loss and damage should be accounted for through an international mechanism.

Forests and REDD

Forest degradation and deforestation, especially of tropic forests, are a major source of global greenhouse gas emissions. Under the banner of REDD+, climate negotiators have agreed on policies for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation. Europe is a large donor of REDD policies and projects, including in Latin America. However, the singular focus of REDD activities on reducing emissions and restoring carbon sinks is not necessarily compatible with biodiversity conservation and social development of traditional communities, that are dependent on the forests.

Whereas many European NGOs agree that an ambitious target for reducing deforestation should be set, they are also concerned about the lack of respect for human rights, lack of adequate social safeguards for projects and inadequate participation by civil society organisations.

Technology Transfer and Cooperation

In addition to financial flows, there is a need for capacity-building and technology transfer to developing countries to realize climate-smart development. With the precipitous drop in cost of renewable energy technologies, developing countries find themselves in a unique position. They can leap frog and provide clean energy access, avoiding many of the costs and problems associated with large-scale fossil resource fuelled grid systems. A part of the energy transition could be GCF funded. Otherwise, NGOs are calling for technology assessment, the development of a so called green list of truly clean technologies, and for stakeholder involvement in the evaluation of the environmental and socio-economic impacts of new technologies that might pose serious risks, like geo-engineering.

Alternative Development Pathways

Major changes mark the positions of European civil society towards long-term climate action, especially when compared to their position prior to Copenhagen. Firstly, there is a clear call for 100% renewable energy by 2050, as well as a call for zero emissions. This is a fundamentally different narrative from one that calls for reducing emissions by x% by year y. At the same time, the fundamental problems plaguing the European emissions trading system have led many organisations to change their position on the use of international carbon markets. The narrative is complemented by a strong campaign against fossil fuel production and consumption subsidies and export

credit support for coal-fired power plants. What we witness are not simply clearer campaigns against the sources of climate pollution and the vested interests behind them, but also an inspiring push for cleaner jobs, regaining community control over renewable energy. Finally, a budding divestment movement which seeks to leave the 80% unburnable carbon in the ground, with the Arctic and coal as flash points, is rounding of what might indeed be called a strategic reset.³⁸

Despite attempts by green groups to leverage the economic crisis to stimulate investment in a clean, resource efficient economy, the debate in Europe for a green economy is at risk of being captured by big business and governments. Similarly, calls by social and environmental experts for policy makers to look beyond GDP, and for development to respect planetary boundaries have not been heeded. Indeed, since the 2012 Rio+20 Summit we observe a growing aversion to greenwashing of voluntary corporate actions.

Some NGOs today fundamentally question the value of “green growth,” others continue to use the concept in their lobbying.

Away from capitals, there is a growing and vibrant civil society movement from the bottom up that builds a green, sharing economy from one “transition town” to the next. In many cities a sharing economy is emerging, local currencies are issued, services traded, urban gardeners are reclaiming lost commons, open source communities are becoming mainstream. In the midst of high youth unemployment, activists are talking about economic degrowth.³⁹

Social movement networks already share many of these experiences across continents. What is rare are tri-partite partnerships forming between government, civil society and the private sector. A further challenge is that once initiatives have grown and are stable, it will be necessary for all these stakeholders to learn to replicate them.

38 Verolme *et al.* (September 2013): What Future for International Climate Politics? – A Call for a Strategic Reset, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, <http://www.boell.de/en/2013/09/05/what-future-international-climate-politics>

39 For an analysis of the commonalities and differences between emerging narratives in Europe and Latin America, see: <http://eu.boell.org/en/2012/11/13/buen-vivir-and-green-new-deal-equivalent-concepts-eu-and-latin-america> and <http://eu.boell.org/en/2012/11/12/summary-differences-similarities-and-possible-articulations-between-buen-vivir-and-green>

Recommendations

Whereas European and Latin American realities are vastly different, there is in all diversity and among strong differences of opinion, a significant degree of convergence visible in the positions held by civil society organisations across both regions. Broadly speaking, one might argue that European organisations tend to have articulated policy positions in more detail, at the same time their positions may lack in context. More critical voices are stronger in Latin America, which can be explained in part by the different recent political histories, with civil society and governments often in open conflict. What in Latin America would be seen as political cooptation of NGOs by government can in a European context be called legitimate lobbying, without giving up NGO independence. Yet, given the fact that with the current climate process civil society shares a clear goal for Paris, we see significant potential for bi-regional dialogue, strategy development and collaboration, which can drive more effective civil society action towards Paris.

As part of a strategy to increase climate ambition and strengthen so called progressive alliances, there is significant scope for collaboration between Europe and Latin America, both between governments and across the breadth and depth of civil society. But as this brief analysis has documented, civil society is large and diverse. People have a common goal, stopping dangerous climate change, and there is significant convergence. But there may not be clear agreement on theories of change or the best mix of policies and measures. These differences run across continents. In particular, both within Europe and Latin America, there is an unresolved debate about the role of market mechanisms, with a number of organisations rejecting these mechanisms. Some take this further, questioning the increasing financialization of natural resources, such as in the context of REDD, which further marginalizes poor communities. Secondly, civil society organisations use a wide range of means of action

and expression. Rather than becoming a source of conflict and undermining the common goal, this diversity of means is now widely recognized as creating a broader basis for the climate movement. Today, there is a willingness to talk and work together across a wider spectrum of views than in the past. It has been recognized that the opponent lies not within the climate movement. These conversations need to include more voices from other regions.

Having said that, a degree of mistrust will remain. There are those who do not want to engage with governments, let alone business, at all. They wish to create alternative spaces and craft new (discourses and) realities, as well as take direct action against the worst polluters. This approach seems more prevalent in Latin America than in Europe. Since the 1970s, European civil society, with the exception of the anti-globalization movement, has engaged with governments with the aim to put in place numerous policies and regulations. This has clearly worked to circumscribe the worst excesses of environmental pollution. Many NGOs have over time moved away from being activist-led groups to expert-driven organisations, reliable interlocutors for governments, not system critics. In Latin America, there is a greater distrust in the wider climate movement of experts, think tanks and lobby groups as they often lack a membership base. We do observe that, as has been the case in Europe, more progressive incoming governments draw upon civil society expertise to swell their ranks. Without taking sides in an often confusing landscape, there is a general need to strengthen capacity of organisations to engage with their national government on issues covered by international climate negotiations. This will give organisations a voice, where previously they were not even able to articulate their demands in terms directly relevant to the policy makers.

This large and diverse climate movement is growing, as evidenced by the Peoples Climate

Marches in September 2014, and we observe that several NGOs are coming full circle.⁴⁰ Today, on the basis of several decades of experience working with as well as against governments and business, it is clear to many that expert knowledge and lobbying are not a sufficient basis for civil society activism to prevent dangerous climate change. European NGOs in particular are again talking about power and politics. Despite significant differences between Europe and Latin America, this is what bridges some of the differences described above. Strategy building with a view towards Paris will require sharing assessments of power and developing new ways to influence. A lot has changed in recent years and many NGOs do not have the latest tools available to them, although good case studies exist.

The implications for strengthening an international ambition alliance are manifold. First of all, it needs to be stated that building trust and strengthening capacity are at the core of any strategy. This requires spaces to be created, some of which will pop up and disappear again, others may evolve and continue to be places for discussion and convergence. In the run up to COP21 in Paris several such spaces are needed, some of them issue specific, some of them with a focused time-limited agenda, others open, without the aim to deliver concrete results on a one year timeline.

— Firstly, there is significant scope for further collaboration between the regions on a post-extractivist economy, including the movement to stop fracking and abandon coal as the dirtiest forms of fossil fuel. When viewed from an international policy perspective, this work to “leave it in the ground” is fundamental to the global goal of limiting warming to below 1.5 degrees Celsius and zero emissions by 2050. Others might frame it as a local struggle against environmental and social destruction.

— Secondly, a further area where an ambition alliance can be strengthened that may deliver results both in the short-term, as well as

lay a foundation for longer-term change on the ground, is the work on real community-owned alternatives to carbon-intensive development. At the local level, we observe many initiatives for alternative development which benefit from exchange and collaboration. These build on a clear normative framework, including human rights and respect for planetary boundaries. At the international level, we can identify a number of workstreams: clean energy access, food security and sustainable rural development, sustainable consumption and production patterns, including closing materials flows, and financial markets and investment for climate resilience. These activities can come together at “Alternatiba!”, the space for civil society in Paris.

— Thirdly, there is scope for deeper collaboration, including the possibility of targeted lobbying around Paris, for strong safeguards around European financing for REDD activities in Latin America. For some governments REDD safeguards are a sensitive issue as they have a strong position about sovereignty. A focus on sovereignty can get in the way of tackling what are real problems on the ground. At the same time, civil society remains deeply divided on the choice of instruments to avoid deforestation. This should not stand in the way of further work.

Finally, more on the governmental side, the 2015 EU-CELAC Summit is scheduled to take place on 10-11 June 2015 in Brussels, under the heading “Designing our common future towards prosperous, cohesive and sustainable societies for our citizens.” It will likely be up to civil society and parliamentarians to develop more in-depth proposals to make the sustainable societies agenda item real. Like in 2013, the main official focus of the Summit is expected to be trade and association agreements. Indeed, this Summit may have to deal with the fall-out of the TTIP agreement, if concluded. We recommend to further increase collaboration between parliamentarians from EUROLAT (Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly) and civil

40 Op-ed about The People's Climate. See: <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/monica-araya-and-hans-verolme-say-that-the-people-s-climate-march-was-just-the-start-of-popular-pressure-on-world-leaders> or in Spanish http://elpais.com/elpais/2014/09/29/planeta_futuro/1412008655_240653.html

society experts/organisations. As a first step and with respect to the current calendar, they could prepare an urgent resolution to be presented to heads of government at the EU-CELAC Summit.⁴¹ In order to do so, the EUROLAT Bureau should propose to the European Parliament's EUROLAT Delegation (DLAT) to nominate the European co-rapporteur for international climate change policy and ask the Latin American branch to do the same. The co-rapporteurs could develop and


draft a joint motion for a resolution with specific recommendations for bi-regional government actions and collaboration towards a more ambitious Paris outcome.

Based on a shared history and values, there is a lot Europe and Latin America can learn from each other. We hope this analysis inspires people to go further on that journey.

41 Relevant EUROLAT documents include: Declaration (17 May 2011): Statement by the Co-Presidents on the UN Conference on climate change in Durban; Resolution (15 May 2010): Tackling climate change challenges together: for an EU-LAC coordinated strategy in the framework of the UNFCCC negotiations; Resolution (8 April 2009): Trade and climate change.

Key Country Data: Emissions, Income and Human Development

Latin American countries	Total GHG Emissions per capita (incl LULUCF) (tCO ₂ e)	GDP-PPP Per Capita (Int\$ (2011))	HDI
Antigua & Barbuda	12.04	\$20,176.69	0.774
Argentina	10.55	n.a	0.808
Bahamas, The	7.59	\$22,630.11	0.789
Belize	45.18	\$8,223.42	0.732
Bolivia	14.71	\$5,278.89	0.667
Brazil	7.13	\$14,043.37	0.744
Chile	5.06	\$19,229.72	0.822
Colombia	4.66	\$10,801.15	0.711
Costa Rica	1.62	\$12,269.91	0.763
Cuba	4.01	\$18,290.92	0.815
Dominica	3.93	\$9,897.90	0.717
Dominican Republic	3.14	\$10,411.79	0.700
Ecuador	9.04	\$9,019.32	0.711
El Salvador	2.27	\$7,236.96	0.662
Grenada	16.68	\$11,690.48	0.744
Guatemala	3.53	\$6,849.09	0.628
Guyana	9.45	\$5,542.06	0.638
Haiti	0.80	\$1,490.86	0.471
Honduras	6.23	\$4,270.05	0.617
Jamaica	4.46	\$8,370.45	0.715
Mexico	5.99	\$15,335.16	0.756
Nicaragua	8.00	\$3,946.34	0.614
Panama	5.75	\$14,034.65	0.765
Paraguay	17.46	\$7,246.92	0.676
Peru	5.15	\$10,460.03	0.737
Saint Kitts & Nevis	6.83	\$19,579.18	0.750
Saint Lucia	6.28	\$10,263.42	0.714
Saint Vincent & Grenadines	2.05	\$10,032.73	0.719
Suriname	17.51	\$14,126.96	0.705
Trinidad & Tobago	34.67	\$29,321.02	0.766
Uruguay	3.90	\$16,337.61	0.790
Venezuela	13.74	\$16,536.28	0.764



European countries	Total GHG Emissions per capita (incl LULUCF) (tCO ₂ e)	GDP-PPP Per Capita (Int\$ (2011))	HDI
Austria	10.70	\$41,787.20	0.881
Belgium	11.85	\$39,693.76	0.881
Bulgaria	6.43	\$15,151.31	0.777
Croatia	3.58	\$19,840.14	0.812
Cyprus	7.93	\$23,980.18	0.845
Czech Republic	11.88	\$26,618.90	0.861
Denmark	10.85	\$41,558.32	0.900
Estonia	21.71	\$21,126.43	0.840
Finland	15.54	\$37,754.53	0.879
France	7.51	\$35,713.83	0.884
Germany	10.11	\$39,668.48	0.911
Greece	9.52	\$28,639.89	0.853
Hungary	7.06	\$21,997.69	0.818
Ireland	13.19	\$42,187.69	0.899
Italy	7.66	\$33,842.74	0.872
Latvia	-1.07	\$18,621.80	0.810
Lithuania	8.62	\$20,670.21	0.834
Luxembourg	23.96	\$89,146.81	0.881
Malta	7.27	\$27,949.61	0.829
Netherlands	13.25	\$42,944.20	0.915
Poland	8.73	\$21,012.19	0.834
Portugal	7.01	\$26,116.37	0.822
Romania	5.81	\$16,644.43	0.785
Slovakia	6.87	\$24,428.01	0.830
Slovenia	2.69	\$28,018.36	0.874
Spain	7.18	\$31,828.61	0.869
Sweden	4.22	\$40,880.42	0.898
United Kingdom	9.23	\$34,696.20	0.892

Sources: WRI – Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) 2.0. ©2014. CAIT data are derived from several sources. Full citations are available at <http://cait2.wri.org/faq.html#q07>. LULUCF data FAO 2014, FAOSTAT Emissions database HDI 2013 index data unadjusted for inequality. Source: UNDP, <http://hdr.undp.org/>

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	<i>Ad hoc</i> working group on the Durban Platform
AILAC	Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (Asociación Independiente de Latinoamérica y el Caribe)
ALBA	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América)
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
BASIC	Bloc of four large newly industrialized countries: Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BRICS	Association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CBDR-RC	Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities
CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
COP	Conference of the Parties
DLat	EUROLAT Delegation
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
EUROLAT	Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly
€	Euro
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
IPCC	Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change
LA	Latin America
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
LAIF	Latin America Investment Facility
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MS	EU Member State
Mercosur	Southern Common Market (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance (defined by the OECD Development Assistance Committee)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
SICA	Central American Integration System (Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana): Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panamá and the Dominican Republic
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
U.S.	United States
US\$	United States Dollar

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Will the international community manage to conclude a fair and ambitious global agreement in Paris in 2015?

In spite of the frustration with the slow progress of multilateral processes, civil society across the world continuously tries to push leaders to commit to meaningful climate action. An ambitious and fair global climate deal can only be reached, if alliances can be formed that go beyond the binary split between developed and developing countries.

The European Union plays a key role in international climate negotiations and should strengthen and build new alliances for an ambitious outcome in Paris. With the 2014 Climate Summit taking place in Lima, Latin America is put into the spotlight of the international climate scene. Based on shared history and

values, Latin America and the European Union could strengthen their bi-regional partnership and develop new narratives that might help to overcome the North-South division.

This report provides an introduction to European and Latin American civil society perspectives on international climate change policy and politics. Europe and Latin America can learn a lot from each other and there is significant scope for deeper collaboration to increase climate ambition. By exploring the potential of joint demands and proposals, the report shows how Europe and Latin America can ally towards more ambitious collective climate action. We hope this analysis inspires civil society organisations and democratic institutions to further explore the potential for collaboration between Europe and Latin America to tackle the global climate crisis.

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